Strategies to achieve universal coverage: are there lessons from middle income countries? by Mills, A
Mills, A (2007) Strategies to achieve universal coverage: are there
lessons from middle income countries? Technical Report. Health Eco-
nomics Planning and Finance, London School of Hygiene and Tropical
Medicine.
Downloaded from: http://researchonline.lshtm.ac.uk/7020/
DOI:
Usage Guidelines
Please refer to usage guidelines at http://researchonline.lshtm.ac.uk/policies.html or alterna-
tively contact researchonline@lshtm.ac.uk.
Available under license: Copyright the publishers
 1 
30 March 2007 
 
Strategies to achieve universal coverage: are there lessons from 
middle income countries? 
 
 
A literature review commissioned by the Health Systems Knowledge 
Network 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Anne Mills 
Health Economics and Financing Programme 
London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine 
 
 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Background to the Health Systems Knowledge Network 
 
The Health Systems Knowledge Network was appointed by the WHO Commission on the Social 
Determinants of Health from September 2005 to March 2007.  It was made up of 14 policy-makers, 
academics and members of civil society from all around the world, each with his or her own area of 
expertise.   The network engaged with other components of the Commission (see 
http://www.who.int/social_determinants/map/en) and also commissioned a number of systematic reviews 
and case studies (see www.wits.ac.za/chp/).   
 
The Centre for Health Policy led the consortium appointed as the organisational hub of the network.  The 
other consortium partners were EQUINET, a Southern and Eastern African network devoted to promoting 
health equity (www.equinetafrica.org), and the Health Policy Unit of the London School of Hygiene in the 
United Kingdom (www.lshtm.ac.uk/hpu).  The Commission itself is a global strategic mechanism to improve 
equity in health and health care through action on the social of determinants of health at global, regional and 
country level.   
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1. Introduction 
 
The desirability of providing universal coverage of health services is not in question.  
Few people, and no countries, would explicitly accept that universal coverage is not a 
desirable goal for a health system.  However the mix of financing sources and 
provision arrangements within a universal coverage system, and the degree of equity 
sought and achieved, vary widely amongst countries.  Countries that have yet to 
achieve universal coverage face many options with respect to strategies which will 
move them closer to universal coverage.  Moreover, given that universal coverage 
requires cross-subsidies of various types, especially from richer groups to poorer 
groups, political dynamics and broader social influences are very important in 
affecting both the choice of strategies and the speed of progress. 
 
In recent years, the topic of universal coverage has received greater attention.  
Rapidly growing countries in South-East Asia, in particular, have chosen to distribute 
some of the fruits of economic growth to their populations in the form of improved 
protection against health care costs.  Countries in Latin America, which have long-
standing social health insurance arrangements and considerable inequities due to 
separate financing arrangements for different population groups, have sought to 
merge arrangements or extend the benefits of better financed schemes to less well-
served populations.  Many African countries have debated various ways to increase 
health care financing.  Countries which historically have achieved universal coverage, 
such as those of Eastern and Central Europe and the former Soviet Union (FSU), have 
embarked on major reforms of the funding sources and provision arrangements for 
universal coverage.  In 2005, the WHO World Health Assembly urged member states 
to ‘plan the transition to universal coverage of their citizens so as to contribute to 
meeting the needs of the population for health care and improving its quality, to 
reducing poverty, ……and to achieving health for all’ (WHO 2005a). 
 
A number of reviews have been written on options facing countries in moving 
towards universal coverage, focusing especially on the role of social health insurance 
(e.g. Carrin and James 2004, Barnighausen and Sauerborn 2002, Abel-Smith 1986).  
Less attention has been given to the political dynamics of change, and the attitudes of 
different stakeholders.   This paper responds to the terms of reference from the Health 
Systems Knowledge Network (see Annex 1), and aims to: 
• review the evidence on strategies to achieve universal coverage, where 
strategies are interpreted not just as technical strategies but also as strategies 
for managing the policy process 
• generate lessons for senior policy-makers, donors and civil society groupings. 
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By agreement with the Knowledge Network, it focuses on countries which have either 
recently achieved universal coverage or are close to achieving it, essentially middle 
income countries, though some limited discussion of the circumstances of low income 
countries is included.  A key issue addressed is the extent to which different strategies 
promote equity, where the concern is both equity of financing and equity of access to 
and use of services.   
 
 
2. Methods 
 
Search strategy: An initial search was done drawing on the following sources: 
• relevant materials were extracted and reviewed from books, papers, reports 
and other documents accumulated over the author’s 30 years’ experience of 
engagement with low and middle income country health systems; these 
materials had been collected for both research and teaching purposes 
• an analysis was done of papers, discussions and a book related to a conference  
‘Achieving Universal Coverage of Health Systems’ organised (with support 
from the author) by the Office of Health Care Reform, Ministry of Public 
Health, Thailand on 15-17 March 1998 and including participants from 
Thailand, Korea, Philippines, Turkey  as well as presentations relating to 
experience from OECD countries, Western Europe, Germany and Argentina   
• a search was done of a database (Gilson 2006) on policy analyses of health 
issues in low and middle income countries (LMIC) for papers relating to 
universal coverage. 
• References and literature reviews were studied of 2 PhD theses relating to 
universal coverage.  
 
For the final version of the paper, a supplementary search was done (see Annex 2) 
which especially targeted regions and countries which had been poorly covered in the 
initial review, namely North Africa, the Middle East, and the countries of the former 
Soviet Union. The primary databases searched were PubMed, Ingenta, ELDIS, 
JSTOR, IBSS and ISS Web of Knowledge. Online searches were performed using 
Google Scholar and the websites of WHO, World Bank, Abt Associates and European 
Observatory for Health.  In addition, searches of the same sources were done to 
complete as far as possible the country summaries in Annex 3. 
 
Type of evidence used: the above searches produced a range of documentation, 
including peer reviewed papers, monographs, books, ‘grey’ literature including 
country case studies, and reports of discussions.  Most evidence was qualitative in 
nature, consisting of conceptual frameworks, cross-country reviews, and specific 
country experiences, with limited quantitative analyses.  To this written evidence was 
added experience gained from the author’s many years of engagement in health policy 
debates relating to universal coverage, especially encompassing policy discussions in 
Thailand and South Africa.  Non-research evidence was also drawn from 5 years’ 
experience of teaching the topic of universal coverage to masters students at the 
LSHTM and LSE, including seminar discussions with many mid-career students with 
personal experience of universal coverage issues in their home countries; and 
experience of supervising 3 Thai PhD students all of whom studied aspects of 
universal coverage in Thailand. 
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How/why evidence selected: Prime attention was paid to evidence from low and 
middle income countries, though use was made of historical evidence from high 
income countries where relevant.  Evidence from middle income countries in Asia 
and Latin America which were close to or had reached universal coverage was 
tabulated according to the themes listed in the terms of reference for the paper (see 
Annex 3 for table and Annex 1 for TOR). 
 
Comment on evidence base: the evidence base on universal coverage is relatively thin, 
especially relating to low and middle income countries.  The term universal coverage 
is used frequently as an aspiration or goal, resulting in innumerable ‘hits’ in web-
based searches (16,500 on Google Scholar using search terms ‘universal coverage 
health developing countries’ for the period 1990-2006), but little specific content on 
experiences of reaching universal coverage, let alone analyses of explanations of 
progress or lack of progress.  For certain countries (especially those in Asia) there is a 
fair amount of evidence on equity of financing and access to health care across socio-
economic groups.  Evidence on gender equity appears almost non-existent. 
 
 
3. Definitional issues 
 
Universal coverage has been defined as ‘a situation where the whole population of a 
country has access to good quality services according to needs and preferences, 
regardless of income level, social status, or residency.  It may be financed through tax 
or through contributory insurance schemes, and organised through one national 
scheme or a number of different schemes’ (Nitayarumphong 1998).  It implies two 
key features: 
• Equity of access  
• Financial risk protection. 
 
While not inherent in the definition, it also is usually assumed to imply equity in 
financing, namely that contributions are made on the basis of ability to pay. 
 
Available definitions differ on whether they are explicit on the type or level of health 
care benefits.  In the above definition, the concern is ‘good quality services’  – IE 
there is no mention of the scope of benefits.  Other definitions refer to ‘necessary 
health care of good quality’ (Kutzin 2000), or ‘appropriate promotive, preventive, 
curative and rehabilitative health care’ (WHO 2005b).   Given the scope for 
expanding the definition of service coverage, universal coverage can be seen as a 
relative rather than absolute concept (Kutzin 2000) with respect to health care 
services, though absolute with respect to population coverage (100%). 
 
Achieving universal coverage requires that attention be paid not just to financial 
arrangements but also to addressing non financial barriers to accessing services.  
These can include geographical and cultural barriers, as well as problems of quality of 
care, including provider behaviour and attitudes, which can discourage access by 
certain population groups especially the poorest and women. 
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4. Financing options for achieving universal coverage in LMIC 
 
Financing involves three interrelated functions: revenue collection, pooling, and 
purchasing (WHO 2000).  Revenue collection involves obtaining contributions from 
households, organisations and donors in the form primarily of tax, mandatory social 
health insurance contributions, voluntary private health insurance contributions, direct 
payments by users, and donations.  Pooling involves managing the funds in such a 
way that risks of paying for health care are borne by the pool and not by individuals 
or specific sub-groups.  Purchasing involves the implicit or explicit transfer of the 
pooled funds to pay for health services, including key decisions on the services to be 
purchased, and the mode of payment.   
 
The essence of financing arrangements for universal coverage is to ensure protection 
against the financial costs of ill-health for everyone.  While historically the depth of 
coverage has usually not been specified, recently there has been an emphasis, 
especially in Latin America, on introducing universal coverage of an essential  
package of services (World Bank 1993, Frenk 2006, Baeza and Packard 2006).   The 
definition of service packages is discussed below, in section 5.2. 
 
In the context of low and middle income countries, financing universal coverage 
essentially means substantially reducing the often very high amounts paid out-of-
pocket for health care, and substantially increasing the share of health financing that 
comes from tax funding and/or contributory health insurance.  The implications of 
such changes for who pays and who benefits will depend on the financing source(s), 
the scope of risk pooling arrangements, the approach to purchasing, and the 
determinants of use of services, including the influence of any mechanisms designed 
to target benefits to specific groups  (Gwatkin 2004). 
 
4.1 Individual financing sources and related structures and systems 
 
Although historically tax funding was associated with a government owned and 
provided health service (known as the Beveridge model after the founder of the UK 
National Health Service), and mandatory health insurance with a more decentralised 
health service with greater private ownership (the Bismark model after the  
Chancellor who created the German system), reforms over the last few decades mean 
that the association between source of funding and mode of provision is less clear.   
Moreover, a key feature of universal coverage arrangements, as discussed later, is 
reliance on a mix of financing sources.  For convenience of exposition the equity 
implications of each source is discussed in turn here, with the overall mix of financing 
found in different systems addressed subsequently.  
 
Tax funded arrangements pool money from all tax payers, with those who are able to 
use services (usually the general population) receiving benefits1.  Funds may flow 
direct to providers from the ministry of health, or via an agency at central or local 
level required to act as a purchaser on behalf of the target population (a purchaser 
provider split).  Equity implications depend on the incidence of taxes, and the 
distribution of benefits.  In Thailand, for example, direct tax is very progressive 
(richer groups pay a higher proportion of income than poorer groups) and indirect tax 
                                                          
1
 The use of tax revenue to subsidise participation in mandatory or voluntary insurance is considered 
later 
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somewhat less progressive (Tancharoensathien, Prakonsai, Limwattananon et al 
2006).   Analysis from Equitap found a similarly progressive pattern for direct taxes 
in Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, though the broader tax base of richer countries in the 
region (e.g. Taiwan, Japan) reduced their degree of progressivity somewhat 
(O’Donnell, van Doorslaer, Rannan-Eliya et al 2005a).   For indirect taxes, Thailand 
was the most progressive, though indirect taxes in other Asian countries were still 
progressive to a fair degree.  
 
Local governments often have some degree of tax-raising powers, which may 
contribute to health service financing in the local government area (as in Kyrgyzstan 
where this contributes 24% of health financing: Jakab et al 2005).  Since few 
countries use adequate equalizing mechanisms to compensate for the differential 
revenue raising ability of local governments, such financing is often geographically 
inequitable (Preker et al, 2002). 
 
There is substantial evidence that tax funding is not necessarily associated with an 
equitable receipt of benefits (Gwatkin 2004).   This can arise from a variety of 
reasons, including a lack of health care infrastructure in the more remote or 
disadvantaged areas where the poor live, and lack of responsiveness of public services 
to the needs of the poor (Palmer in press).  This pattern is not however universal: Sri 
Lanka provides an example where health services do well in serving the needs of 
poorer groups (Russell in press). 
 
Mandatory social health insurance (SHI) raises money from contributions by 
employers and their employees who fall within the scheme (almost always those in 
formal employment), and uses it to pay for health services for members; sometimes 
there may be a tax subsidy to the scheme; sometimes there is a subsidy in the other 
direction, to non members as in Colombia where there is a 1% tax to support the 
subsidised insurance scheme for low income households.     The self-employed are 
often allowed to join voluntarily, though such membership is usually low. Risk 
pooling and premium payment arrangements are likely to mean that payment, to a fair 
degree, is related to income2 and use is related to need/demand. In Taiwan, for 
example, the ratio of insurance fund payments for care to premiums is highest for the 
poorest population quintile (1.75) and lowest for the top quintile (0.96) (Chiang 
2005).   However in Egypt, men receive three times the level of benefit as women   
(Gwatkin, 2004:19); and some schemes (for example in Thailand) cover only the 
worker, excluding their family members. 
 
A number of countries have historically had multiple compulsory insurance schemes, 
often linked to major employers (e.g. Korea, Colombia), where pooling occurred only 
within each scheme.  Such arrangements can be quite inequitable, since not all 
schemes are equally prosperous or cover population groups with similar risk profiles.  
Korea, for example, has chosen to unify arrangements into a single fund (Kwon 
2003).  An alternative approach is to introduce risk equalisation arrangements via a 
virtual fund, where schemes with a higher risk profile are compensated by financial 
transfers (as in Colombia, Rosa and Alberto, 2004).   
 
                                                          
2
 SHI tends to be less progressive than tax financing because premiums are often a set proportion of 
income with caps on contributions above a certain income level, though subsidies to lower income 
members may offset this to some degree (Wagstaff 2005). 
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Given the common link between formal employment and mandatory insurance, SHI 
coverage is usually initially limited to the formal sector, providing better funded care 
than that available to poorer populations who fall outside its net.   This has historically 
been the experience in many countries in Latin America (Mills 1983).  McIntyre et al 
(2005) argue that in African countries where social health insurance has been 
attempted – eg Tanzania, Ghana, and Kenya - it has led to the entrenchment of a two 
tier health system, ‘creating a deep divide between the insured, who have excellent 
access to a wide range of high quality health services, and the uninsured who often are 
consigned to under-resourced public sector services for the poor’ (2005:37).  
 
Private voluntary health insurance (VHI) can serve a number of functions.  Mossialos 
and Thomson (2002) identify three forms: VHI which substitutes for mandatory 
insurance; VHI which provides complementary coverage for services excluded or not 
fully covered by such insurance; and VHI which provides supplementary coverage for 
faster access and increased consumer choice.   The first form can be used as a policy 
tool, to encourage (or require) richer population groups to purchase their own health 
care coverage.  The third form can happen by default, as in many Latin American 
countries where richer households are not satisfied with the statutory scheme and 
choose to purchase VHI in addition.  VHI can reduce the degree of equity of the 
health system as a whole by removing richer groups from pooling arrangements, as in 
Chile (Kutzin 2000), and by accentuating differences in the amount and quality of 
care available to different population groups. The review by McIntyre et al (2005) 
indicates that in Africa, private health insurance has had very limited success and that 
in South Africa these schemes cover only a small proportion of the population, have 
led to the fragmentation of risk pools and an increase in expenditures, and have 
increasingly captured tax subsidies. 
 
Community-based or cooperative health insurance is a form of VHI, though with very 
distinct characteristics, such as an emphasis on community ownership and 
empowerment.  With the exception of a few well known schemes, membership is 
usually small, and benefits limited.  Schemes usually have difficulty enrolling the 
poorest (Ranson, Sinha, Chatterjee et al 2006).  Within schemes, there is experience 
of both equitable cross-subsidies (Dror, Koren and Steinberg in press) and inequitable 
ones (Ranson, Sinha, Chatterjee et al 2006).  From a systems perspective, community 
health insurance may result in poorer groups contributing to their health care costs to 
a greater extent than richer groups who are able to access public services, and thus 
may be inequitable with respect to payment.   
 
Donations as a substantial source of financing are most significant in low income 
countries, where they tend to be a volatile source of funding, varying from year to 
year.  They flow from external agencies either via government or direct to service 
providers.   Their in-country equity implications depend on the existing equity of 
services, or the extent to which the donor-funded project seeks to target specific 
groups.   
 
Direct payments are an extremely important source of health financing in many 
countries.  Usually they constitute direct payment to providers independent of other 
sources of funding, though in some countries sizeable copayments may be required by 
SHI (e.g. Korea).  In many countries informal payments are of major concern: for 
example Ensor and Savelyeva (1998) argue that informal payments in Kazakstan are 
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so important that they negatively impact on access to care and the functioning of 
formal payment systems. Direct payments are usually regressive, though since they 
may be unaffordable to the poorest, this effect may be less pronounced than might be 
expected.    
 
4.2 Equity implications of mixes of financing  
 
The overall equity of financing universal coverage in a country depends not only on 
the incidence of individual financing sources but also on their share in total health 
financing.   Table 1 summarises the overall incidence of health financing for Asian 
countries with or approaching universal coverage (data from O’Donnell, van 
Doorslaer, Rannan Eliya et al 2005a).  Countries where general tax funding makes up 
a higher share (eg Thailand, Sri Lanka, Hong Kong) appear to have a more 
progressive pattern of health financing than those dependent more on mandatory 
social health insurance financing (eg Korea, Taiwan).  This pattern of a less 
progressive financing system in countries relying on mandatory health insurance is 
accentuated by the substantial copayments required from the insured in countries such 
as Korea3.   
 
A key influence on the equity of overall arrangements is the extent to which the 
different sources of financing are pooled and services provided on the basis of need 
and irrespective of which scheme people fall under.  In Thailand, for example, despite 
the existence of legislation which permits funds of the three main schemes (the civil 
servants scheme, the social security scheme, and the 30B4 scheme for the rest of the 
population) to be channelled through the National Health Security Office, these three 
schemes are still funded and operated largely separately.  Expenditures per insured 
member and subsidies per insured member differ markedly, with civil servants 
benefiting from the highest expenditure and the greatest subsidy (ILO 2004), and 30B 
scheme members benefiting least. 
 
In Kyrgyzstan, general tax revenues are pooled by the Mandatory Health Insurance 
Fund (MHIF), which provides a basic benefit package for the whole population 
(Jakab et al, 2005).  Compulsory health insurance provides contributions to a second 
pool, also managed by the MHIF, which entitles contributors to a complementary 
package providing lower co-payment for referrals and outpatient drug benefit.  
Certain needy population groups  are also fully or partially exempt from co-payments. 
 
Colombia and Mexico provide Latin American examples where complete merger or 
standardisation of arrangements for the whole population have not been achieved, 
since the benefit package for those who fall outside mandatory social health insurance 
is less generous (Frenk et al 2005, Rosa and Alberto 2004 ). 
 
4.3. Policy choices on financing universal coverage 
 
Governments face choices on mixes and balance of sources of finance for universal 
coverage.  Based on the material in the previous section, this section suggests which 
                                                          
3
 Note that these data show only half the picture needed to judge the equity of universal coverage 
arrangements; information on take up of benefits is needed to complete the picture. 
4
 Just under US$1 
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sources of finance might be less desirable and which more desirable, as well as 
addressing feasibility questions. 
 
As implied above, the inclusion of private voluntary health insurance as a core 
element in universal coverage financing arrangements is controversial.  It can in 
principle increase financial protection and access to health services for those willing 
and able to pay, but at a likely cost in terms of hampering the achievement of broad 
equity goals.  For example in Chile, the health insurance reforms which allowed the 
better-off to opt out of public insurance arrangements and choose their own private 
insurer have damaged the efficiency and equity of the whole health system (Baeza 
and Munoz 1999), even though the public subsidies appear well targeted via the 
public insurance arrangements for the lower income groups, with 90% reaching the 
indigent and 8% going to other low income beneficiaries (Bitran et al 2000).  Few low 
and middle income countries currently have a substantial private insurance market, 
and the competencies needed to create such as market are in short supply (Gottret and 
Schieber 2006:109).   In addition, private insurance is not likely to cover more than a 
small proportion of the population, especially in poorer countries (McIntyre at al 
2005).  Thus it is not generally considered a desirable option for low and middle 
income countries.    
 
Where there is a substantial private insurance sector, as in South Africa, there is the 
possibility of using private insurers as intermediaries managing premium collection 
and payment of service within a compulsory insurance system.   In Colombia, for 
example, people in the contributory insurance arrangement can choose their preferred 
insurer (Yepes 2000).  A risk equalisation fund can be used to try and ensure that 
insurers do not cream-skim, by seeking to enrol healthier members.   This works by 
pooling contributions and distributing them to insurers in relation to the risk profile of 
their members.  There are strong reasons to believe that such arrangements are 
unlikely to prevent selection behaviour by insurers, but there is little evidence on the 
extent of this problem in Colombia (Gottret and Schieber 2006:264). 
 
Voluntary community-based or cooperative insurance historically played an important 
role in the evolution of European and Japanese universal coverage arrangements 
(Criel 1998, Ogawa, Hasegawa, Carrin et al 2003), and it has been argued that it could 
do the same with respect to low and middle income countries.  It can potentially raise 
awareness of the value of insurance, create experience in managing risk pooling 
arrangements, and provide some degree of risk protection for groups poorly served by 
the public system (Ranson, Devadasan, Sinha et al 2006).  However, the great 
majority of current schemes enrol only a small proportion of the eligible population, 
are small in size, and provide only limited financial protection (Bennett, Creese and 
Monasch 1998,  Carrin, Waelkens and Criel 2005). Few survive for long, suggesting 
that they will need to evolve into more formal arrangements if they are to provide 
sustainable risk protection.    
 
In terms of financing source, a key choice facing countries on the transition path to 
universal coverage is between general tax funding or mandatory social insurance 
payments, or mixes of these.  In addition, even in high income countries with 
universal coverage, user fees or copayments usually still exist to some degree, so 
countries face choices on whether or not to retain user fee elements, and what to 
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charge for.  In general, the wealthier the country, the smaller is the share of health 
financing from out-of-pocket payments (Figure 1).   
 
Of OECD countries, mandatory insurance payments dominate in 15, general tax in 12, 
and 3 have a mix (WHO 2005b).  In some countries in central and eastern Europe and 
the FSU, where there have been reforms to the previously centrally planned and 
funded systems, mandatory insurance dominates in 3 (Slovenia, Slovakia, Estonia), 
general tax revenues in 3 (Latvia, Romania, Kazakstan), and informal and out-of-
pocket payments in 4 (Georgia, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova)  (Preker et al 
2002).   In general terms, both tax and SHI funding have their advantages and 
disadvantages, which have been extensively reviewed and are summarised in Table 2.  
Advantages and disadvantages also greatly depend on the precise design and 
implementation features within countries (Kutzin 2000), as well as on country 
context, history, and institutional arrangements, making generic statements on which 
is better misleading.  Wagstaff (2005), after reviewing the experience of Japan and the 
Asian ‘tigers’ (Hong Kong, Korea, Taiwan, Singapore), similarly concludes that the 
design of systems of financing and provision crucially affect how tax-financed and 
SHI-financed systems perform.  In many ways, in terms of reform, the key issue is 
political and institutional – which risk pooling method is more acceptable to key 
stakeholders, more capable of being implemented.  This is addressed further in section 
8 below.  
 
Three considerations are worth highlighting.  Firstly, given the management capacity 
constraints common to less developed countries, one key consideration is the 
management requirements of raising funds and using them for health services.  
Wagstaff (2007) has recently questioned the common assumption that governments 
cannot increase general revenues to increase health expenditure but can make social 
health insurance contributions mandatory.  He argues that raising additional tax 
revenue is feasible, and indeed has been done successfully by a number of countries, 
and that it does not seem to be easier to collect SHI revenues than general tax.   For 
example, Yepes (2005) has drawn attention to the very substantial management 
demands of SHI (which go beyond just the raising of money) and especially to 
problems of corruption in the Colombian system, including avoiding joining a 
compulsory insurance scheme, and under-declaring income.  Dixon et al (2004) 
indicate a further  issue, that of ensuring that collected funds are actually transferred 
to pay providers: in Kyrgyzstan, they comment that what was intended to be an 
earmarked tax for health has become a discretionary transfer by the Social Fund. 
 
Secondly, although tax funding has much to recommend it in terms of administrative 
simplicity, a key issue is ensuring that health continues to attract the necessary funds.  
In Thailand, for example, capitation rates that are lower than those thought necessary 
by analysts have been consistently set (Tangcharoensathein, Prakonsai, 
Limwattananon et al 2006), in order to keep costs down to the exchequer.  In Costa 
Rica, a notable historical success in terms of universal coverage, those paying payroll 
taxes are subsidising to a considerable extent the non contributory regime (Table 3), 
an increasingly unpopular situation which encourages lower reporting of salaries 
(Saenz-Pacheco 2005). 
 
Thirdly, governments need to set their priorities for public expenditure between 
different sectors.  Increasing funds to the health sector, whether through general or 
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earmarked tax, is at the expense of using these funds for other purposes.  The poorer 
the country, the more difficult the choices will be between alternative worthwhile uses 
of funds, which will include uses with health benefits (such as education). 
      
4.4 Provider payment mechanisms 
 
Provider payment is one of the key issues in purchasing arrangements, and is of 
fundamental importance in the process of achieving universal coverage since it can 
greatly affect the cost of cover (Carrin and Hanvoravongchai 2003) and hence how 
quickly it is feasible to offer the whole population the same level of benefits.  For 
social insurance arrangements where the insurance agency and provider are separate 
bodies5, traditional payment arrangements have been based on fee-for-service.  
However, such payment systems have been shown to encourage cost inflation through 
increasing the volume of services (as in Korea: Moon 1998).  This tendency is 
aggravated when prices are set well below normal charges as they were in Korea, for 
example, and creates the further problem that providers may raise charges to the 
uninsured as a further means of compensating for low prices for the insured. Concerns 
in tax funded arrangements of the inefficiency of historical patterns of allocation, and 
the reforms introduced in recent years – for example switching to case-based or 
capitation payment as in Thailand in the 30B scheme – mean that discussions about 
payment system are prominent also in tax-funded arrangements. 
  
Payment methods which offer greater control over total costs than fee-for-service 
include case-based methods, capitation, global budgets and block contracts.  All have 
their advantages and disadvantages, which relate to the nature of the incentives they 
provide for over or under provision and care of good quality.  The Thai experience of 
capitation shows that it can be a very effective means to contain costs and simplify 
administration, though there have been concerns that this has been at the expense of 
the quantity and quality of services, especially that provided by the private sector 
(Carrin et al 1999, Mills, Bennett, Siriwanarangsun et al 2000).  A number of 
countries, for example Korea, Taiwan and Thailand, are experimenting with case 
payment based on DRGs.  Countries of the Former Soviet Union also provide a rich 
source of evidence (Dixon et al 2004), such as the use of capitation and global budget 
in Kyrgystan, Moldova, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.  In Kyrgystan, the MHIF has 
linked its contracting decision to performance indicators, contracts only with 
accredited hospitals, and specifies contract terms at inception.  Kyrgystan has 
introduced hospital payments on a case-basis, with payment rates defined 
prospectively based on a system similar to Diagnostic Related Groups (DRGs) but 
created from Kyrgyz utilization and cost data (Bonilla-Chacin, 2005:395-6). The 
MHIF pays general practitioners a capitation based on the number of people enrolled.  
 
Of all the potentially sensitive issues in universal coverage, selection and reform of 
payment methods is often one of the most sensitive since it threatens the interests of 
key actors.  Medical associations tend to favour fee-for-service, and fear payment 
methods which shift risk towards them.  As Korea and Taiwan found, once fee-for-
service payment is in place, it is very difficult to move towards case-based or 
capitation payment.  Similar problems arise where doctors historically gain part of the 
income from drug dispensing – they vehemently oppose removal of their role in 
                                                          
5
 IE in contrast to the common Latin American arrangements where social insurance agencies ran there 
own services 
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dispensing, as seen in South Africa (Lucy Gilson personal communication), for 
example.   Wagstaff (2005) concludes, on the basis of experience in Taiwan and 
Korea, that the concessions required to obtain approval for the separation of 
dispensing and prescribing may be more costly than the original policy.  
 
 
5. Delivery options in low and middle income settings  
 
5.1 Different types of providers and role of primary care 
 
The two key issues on delivery options under universal coverage concern whether or 
not to allow access to non state providers, and how to encourage access to care at the 
lowest effective level.  Earlier debates have included the issue of whether different 
schemes should have their own facilities, as historically was the case with SHI in a 
number of Latin American countries (Mills 1983), but the expansion of service 
infrastructure, and the increasing preferences for contractual arrangements, appears to 
have removed this issue as a point of debate. 
 
Historically it was possible to maintain that expansion of risk protection arrangements 
should channel users to public services (Mills 1983, Abel-Smith 1986), which would 
then benefit from extra funding.  However, over recent years, countries have seen a 
great expansion in private providers especially in urban settings and in previously 
controlled environments such as China, Vietnam and the FSU, especially at primary 
care level (Dixon et al, 2004).  Where private providers are available, people 
increasingly expect that they should have the right to choose their preferred provider.   
This is feasible within universal coverage if there are contractual arrangements with 
non state providers, and if payment mechanisms ensure containment of costs.  For 
example in Thailand, those covered by the social security scheme can choose their 
preferred provider, which then receives a capitation payment to cover the cost of care.  
The Thai 30B scheme (which covers everyone outside the formal and government 
sectors) has a similar capitation arrangement, though currently provides a choice 
between public and private services to only a limited extent, since the bulk of 30B 
members live in provincial towns and rural areas where private provider availability is 
more limited.   
 
Within the Thai scheme, a major policy has been to try and build up the district health 
system, in order to encourage people to access the most local source of care first, 
before resorting to care at a general hospital (Tancharoensathien, Prakonsai, 
Limwattananon et al 2006).  People are required to register with a primary care unit, 
and to seek care there first.  This policy appears to have encouraged greater use of 
health centres and district hospitals.  Korea also imposed a referral process, in 1989, 
but Peabody, Lee and Bickel (1995) observed that many patients chose to go direct to 
specialists and pay the full cost.  For a gatekeeper policy to be effective, the primary 
care level must be easily accessible and of good quality, and the referral process needs 
to work smoothly.  Incentives to retain patients at the lowest desirable level should 
not constrain appropriate referrals.  In Thailand, where admission to hospital attracts a 
DRG-weighted payment, there were some reports from patients with heart conditions 
that the district hospital was reluctant to refer them to the provincial hospital (P. 
Prakonsai, personal communication).   
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5.2 Benefit package options 
 
In theory, the definition of the benefit package is key in making universal coverage 
feasible.  No country is able to provide universal coverage of all services that 
technically are available, so some type of rationing is inevitable.  Limiting the benefit 
package to a specific set of high priority services can mean that it is affordable to 
provide these services to everyone.  However there are four difficulties with this 
approach. 
 
Firstly, if the package excludes services for which there is substantial demand, people 
will purchase these, thereby potentially incurring catastrophic payments.  Countries 
have a difficult choice between including in the package services which are highly 
cost-effective but may be relatively cheap to buy, and those which may be less cost-
effective but very expensive to purchase for those who need them.  For example, 
Thailand excluded renal replacement therapy from its benefit package for universal 
coverage on cost-effectiveness grounds (Tancharoensathein, Prakonsai, 
Limwattananon et al 2006).  Yet unpublished work is showing that households with a 
member with kidney failure can be impoverished as a result (P. Prakonsai personal 
communication).  According to burden of disease statistics, nephritis and nephrotis 
account for around 1% of deaths in low and middle income countries (Lopez, Mathers 
and Ezzati et al 2006), suggesting it is a not insignificant cause of ill health and death, 
but treatment of kidney failure is extremely expensive, with a not very attractive cost-
effectiveness ratio.  Given financial constraints on the health sector, it may be more 
appropriate to see issues of helping households to cope with the less common 
conditions which can have catastrophic consequences as a broader safety net problem 
(for example requiring welfare support targeted to those who need it) rather than an 
issue which the health sector should itself solve. 
 
Secondly, it is not straightforward to be explicit about the content of a benefit package 
or to ensure that providers follow in a transparent fashion a set of rules.  People 
present to a health facility usually with an ill-defined problem, and providers then 
need to respond as best they can.  The benefit package will in effect be limited by the 
skills mix, training, drugs and equipment available at different levels of care, as well 
as by how well referral mechanisms work.  It will also be affected by the attitudes of 
providers and how they choose to ration access (Preker et al 2002). 
 
Thirdly, physical access, as well as other barriers to access such as cultural barriers, 
are key to making a benefit package a reality, once financial access problems are 
reduced by risk pooling.   Although it is clear that Thailand’s extensive health 
infrastructure has greatly contributed to making universal coverage a reality, some 
evidence indicates that in the case of the elderly, utilisation differences for inpatient 
care between rural and urban residents have not yet been completely removed by 
universal coverage, probably because services are mainly in urban centres 
(Srithamrongsawat and Mills 2006).  The policy of building up the district health 
system is designed to help address this, and does seem to have encouraged more local 
outpatient care access for the elderly.  In VIMO SEWA, a community-based 
insurance scheme in Gujarat, take-up of insurance scheme benefits is much lower 
amongst members living in more remote districts, probably due at least in part to 
problems of physical access to services (Ranson, Sinha, Chatterjee et al 2006). 
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Finally, certain population groups almost inevitably will be able to access either 
higher quality or a broader range of services, effectively making the benefit package a 
minimum that is universally available, rather than the standard that all have access to.  
This can happen in two ways.  Firstly, many countries on the path towards universal 
coverage have different health care schemes for different population groups – for 
example different services for the military, civil servants, the formal sector, the 
informal sector – and their benefit packages usually differ with some being more 
generous than others.  Secondly, richer people will always be able to purchase 
additional services outside the package. 
 
A key choice facing countries is whether the benefit package should include all levels 
of care (within what is affordable) or only services that are more costly – for example 
hospital admissions and chronic care.  For the very poorest, any level of health 
expenditure can be difficult to cope with, but in slightly wealthier countries, primary 
care expenditure is usually affordable and it is continuing payments for chronic 
conditions or hospitalisation costs that threaten household livelihoods.  Russell, for 
example, found that in Sri Lanka, even poor families often paid for primary care, but 
free hospital care provided a vital safety net (Russell in press).   VIMO SEWA 
reimburses the cost of hospitalisations, but does not cover outpatient or primary care.   
Medical savings accounts arrangements are based on a similar principle – that only 
the most expensive treatments need an external insurance arrangement; otherwise 
people can pay out of pocket or using personal savings. 
 
Drugs are probably the most straightforward part of medical care where a defined 
benefit package is feasible.  For example Kyrgystan has developed an innovative 
outpatient drug package with a limited list of items (Dixon et al, 2004).   
 
 
5.3 Tiering/quality of care for different population groups 
 
Within universal coverage arrangements, issues of different population groups having 
access to services of different levels of quality is one of the most difficult to deal with.    
Such inequalities are often entrenched firstly in the existence of different financing 
arrangements for different population groups, and secondly in the unequal distribution 
of access to services across a country.  Inequities may also be influenced by social and 
cultural factors, such as the inability of women to travel alone outside the home, or to 
access cash to pay fees.  
 
There are many examples of inequalities in Africa and the FSU. For example in 
Tajikistan, there are significant differences in utilisation rates by socio-economic 
groups, related to ability to pay’(Falkingham (2004: 247).  Similarly, Gwatkin (2004) 
found that socio-economic inequalities in health service use for children’s diarrhoea 
and acute respiratory infections and for obstetric deliveries show that coverage rates 
increase steadily across quintiles for each of the three interventions.  Removing these 
differentials has been a long term process even in wealthy countries.  An immediate 
step that countries can take is to initiate a process of standardising benefit packages 
and tax subsidies across different schemes, as Thailand has been seeking to do.  
Where countries have inherited many small schemes, as was the case in Korea, 
mergers of schemes can create economies of scale as well as help improve the equity 
of financing and access to health care. 
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Wagstaff (2007) has recently argued that in almost all respects general tax funding is 
more attractive than SHI, except in the difficulty it faces in ensuring the better-off do 
not gain a disproportionate share of benefits from public services.  He suggests that 
forcing the better off into the private sector if they want more sophisticated care, as in 
Brazil, Sri Lanka and Malaysia, would create a 2 tier system but is likely to be more 
equitable than the alternative of having richer groups skew public services in their 
favour.   This implies a more positive view of the role for private insurance, as a 
complement or supplement to general tax funding, than that presented earlier in this 
paper. 
 
6. Strategies for disadvantaged groups  
 
6.1 Financing 
 
The issue of financing coverage for disadvantaged groups is a major concern of 
systems which rely heavily on mandatory insurance funding, since insurance 
premiums can be collected most easily in the formal sector.  Commonly, it takes a 
considerable amount of time before social health insurance arrangements are extended 
to cover those outside the formal sector and universal coverage is reached.  However.  
Carrin and James (2004) argued that the speed of change is increasing: the transition 
period in Germany was 127 years, Austria 69 years, and Belgium 118 years, but for 
Costa Rica it was 20 years, and Korea 26 years. However, the FSU and especially 
Africa still lag behind, particularly for reasons to do with the structure of employment 
(Ensor 1999). In some regions this problem is getting worse because of increased 
informalisation of the workforce including sub-contracting arrangements.  Gideon, for 
example, finds that in Chile, it is low income women who are often most at risk of 
exclusion from formal insurance arrangements (Gideon 2007). 
 
Extension of SHI cover to self-employed and low income workers has been financed 
in a number of ways (Mills 1998), with support from general tax often being key. The 
cost of insurance premiums can be kept low by providing highly subsidised public 
hospital care to such members (Singapore); social insurance funds can be used to 
cross-subsidise care for low income workers (Mexico, Costa Rica) or for formal 
sector employees of private firms as planned in Tanzania (McIntyre et al, 2005); all 
compulsory health insurance premiums can be subsidised by public funds (Thailand), 
or only those of the low income employed and self-employed, identified through 
some form of a means test (Philippines (Obermann, Jowett, Alcantara et al 2006), 
Korea, Turkey); innovative ways can be found of incorporating farmers, who usually 
make up the bulk of the self-employed (payment at the time of harvest; payment 
related to assets as well as or in place of income: Korea); the government can 
encourage and subsidise voluntary insurance or prepayment schemes which in time 
might become compulsory (Philippines, Ghana: McIntyre et al, 2005). 
 
A related issue is how to finance the extension of cover to those without a steady 
income, namely many of the aged, the unemployed, and the disabled.   A considerable 
number of the elderly, as well as children, can be covered as the dependants of those 
in formal sector employment: this, for example, has been frequently recommended as 
the next stage in the extension of the Thai social health insurance scheme, was done in 
Costa Rica in 1956 (Carrin and James 2004), and has been planned in Kenya 
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(McIntyre et al, 2005).  A few countries have introduced insurance specifically for 
children – for example school children in Egypt (Nandakumar et al, 2000).  Free care 
funded through general tax can be given to especially vulnerable groups (e.g. in many 
countries including Moldova and Burundi, pregnant women and children under five 
receive free care). In Europe, rights to health care have often been added to cash 
benefits given within social security schemes (for example for those who become 
unemployed), and those on social assistance may have their contributions paid for 
them (Mills 1998). 
A key issue in this extension of cover is whether separate arrangements are made for 
the various population groups not in formal employment: for example a separate and 
self-contained arrangement created for the self-employed with tax subsidies; or 
whether government funding is used to bring them under the umbrella of the 
compulsory insurance scheme.  The experience of countries in Asia suggests that the 
former is the preferred or most feasible option in the first instance: for example Japan, 
Korea and Taiwan all have had historical experience of separate arrangements for 
different population groups.  Over time the different schemes were standardised and 
made more compatible, one of the key issues being at what point it is affordable to the 
government to bring the benefits for lower income groups up to the level of those in 
formal employment.  Thailand also created a separate general tax-funded arrangement 
for the uninsured (the 30B scheme), and over time is intending to harmonise benefits 
across schemes.  
Mexico has also taken the route of a specific programme for the uninsured.  A major 
programme of voluntary insurance has been launched, to eventually protect 12m 
uninsured families and to guarantee them an explicit package of benefits (Frenk 
2006).  Financial transfers to states to cover the cost are linked to enrolment numbers, 
and over time the package is increasing in depth of coverage.  The poorest two deciles 
are not required to contribute financially (Frenk, Knaul, Gonzalez-Pier et al 2005) and 
are intended to receive priority in the expansion of enrolment. In the early years of the 
scheme, 90% of enrolees were from the poorest quintile and over 70% were female-
headed households, in part because of the predominance of single mothers amongst 
non salaried workers, though a recent study has found that only 43% are in the poorest 
quintile (Scott 2006).  Women may be more likely to appreciate the benefits of 
enrolment: evidence from a community based health insurance scheme in West Africa 
suggests that women favour enrolment, since they can obtain care for their children 
without needing to find money (Arhin 1994).  The challenge, as now faced in 
Colombia, will be to achieve high coverage of the target population: Colombia had 
anticipated achieving full coverage and phasing out all supply side subsidies in favour 
of transfers to those insured in the subsidised scheme.  However this has proved 
neither feasible or affordable (Gaviria, Medina and Mejia in Wagstaff 2006).  
 
Services for the general public do not necessarily reached disadvantaged groups.  
When fees are charged, exemptions are required for disadvantaged groups, though 
they rarely work well.  A more promising approach is an equity fund, which 
compensates the facility for the less of fee revenue (Hanson et al in press).  Where 
care is free, the problem of reaching disadvantaged groups is not inherently one, as it 
is for insurance, of contribution being tied to benefit, but rather one of service 
availability and quality.  A financing solution increasingly being discussed is that of 
introducing subsidies or incentives in the form of direct payments to users, either 
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untied or conditional on use of services.  This is being tried out, for example, in order 
to encourage pregnant women to deliver in facilities in Nepal (Borghi et al 2006).  
While experience of such conditional cash transfers is reported to be highly positive 
in several Latin American countries, there is virtually no evaluation evidence from 
low income settings (Palmer et al 2004).   
 
Despite the enthusiasm for a greater degree of targeting of general tax funding – 
whether through cash transfers to individuals as an incentive to use publicly funded 
services, or though providing insurance coverage in a subsidised scheme as in 
Colombia and Mexico, or through funding a local purchaser such as a contracting unit 
for primary care in Thailand, there is little evidence on how well these arrangements 
work in efficiency or equity terms, and whether the increased transactions costs 
outweigh the benefits.    A recent study in Bogota has found that for first level 
services, hierarchical arrangements have been replaced by a bilateral monopoly, and 
referrals to higher levels of care are complicated by disputes between insurers and 
providers (Castano-Yepes personal communication).    More broadly, the advantages 
of demand-side funding, and a purchaser provider split, have yet to be conclusively 
established (Mills et al 2006). 
 
6.2 Benefits 
 
Inclusion within a financing scheme does not guarantee access to benefits (health 
care).  Even wealthy countries struggle to ensure equal access for all population 
groups.   Benefit incidence studies for developing countries generally show that richer 
groups gain more benefit from public spending than poorer groups (Filmer 2003). For 
example, Gwatkin (2004) shows that in seven countries studied in Africa, government 
expenditure at secondary and tertiary levels benefited most the top quintile of the 
population, while for primary care the top 20 percent of the population received one 
and a half times as much gain as the bottom 20 percent of the population; and in 
developing and transitional regions in general, the better-off gained more from public 
spending than the rest of the population except in Latin America. 
 
Table 4 shows data, for a subset of the countries in table 1, on the percentage of the 
total health care subsidy accruing to the poorest and richest 20% (data from 
O’Donnell, van Doorslaer and Rannan-Eliya 2005b).  Note that this reflects the level 
of utilisation and the unit cost of providing that care.  It is not a comprehensive 
assessment of the equity of benefits under universal coverage since individuals may 
receive benefits under their insurance arrangement from private providers (as in 
Thailand).    Hong Kong has a strongly pro-poor distribution of public subsidies, and 
in Sri Lanka and Thailand it is approximately pro poor.   Inpatient care tends to be the 
least pro poor. 
 
Strategies to make services easily accessible are vital to achieving universal access.  
For example, during transition to universal coverage, and in order to improve access 
in rural areas, Korea focused efforts on the supply of health care in the countryside 
(Peabody, Lee, and Bickel 1995).  Funding was provided to build remote health care 
centres, and to subsidise insurance societies in those areas.  Tax incentives were given 
to encourage development of private hospitals and clinics in remote areas.  Pilot 
programmes were established with non-physician providers, to address the problem of 
mal-distribution of physicians.  Thailand, similarly, had many years of building up the 
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health care infrastructure across the country, though emphasising the extension of the 
public network of facilities. 
 
Once infrastructure is in place, remaining issues largely concern the access of groups 
who are marginalised or excluded, for whom special efforts may be necessary.  For 
example in Thailand, the registration process presents difficulties to people who are 
very mobile, and who are often the poorest (Pannarunothai in press).  In some settings 
women may be especially disadvantaged. 
 
 
7. Contextual factors opening up policy space for universal coverage6 
 
There is very limited information for middle income countries on what contextual 
factors support the pursuit of universal coverage.  Clearly there are economic aspects 
which strongly influence progress, such as the proportion and rate of increase of the 
work force in the formal sector for mandatory insurance, and the rate of economic 
growth, for both tax and insurance systems.  However, these conditions tend to be 
facilitatory – they do not explain why countries at similar income levels might make 
different choices with respect to speed of progress to universal coverage. 
 
A limited number of papers have highlighted the main aspects of the context in 
specific countries which explained progress towards universal coverage.  The political 
regime seems to be influential but not necessarily its complexion: the military regime 
in Korea initiated progress towards universal coverage by introducing SHI (Kwon 
2002), whereas successive military regimes in Thailand opposed SHI (Pannarunothai 
in press).  Rapid progress in Thailand was made when a popularist regime chose the 
extension of financial protection to the uncovered as part of its election platform 
(Nitayarumphong 2006).  This was underpinned by many years of experimentation 
and gradual progress led by public health bureaucrats.    
 
Both Thailand and Malaysia have a history of building up public provision, but 
whereas in Thailand health financing relied heavily on user fees in public facilities, in 
Malaysia there was strong emphasis on a universal welfare model with minimal fees 
(Barraclough 1999).  This paradigm in Malaysia was increasingly challenged in the 
1990s, with a frequently expressed desire to reduce the role of the state in welfare 
provision (as well as the economy at large) and to encourage savings, private 
insurance and employer-funded coverage.  In fact both Malaysia and Thailand 
pursued strong free market-based policies in economic sectors, but Thailand managed 
a more balanced position with respect to the health sector, allowing private providers 
to expand but keeping control over financing.    Yet despite the language of reform, 
change in Malaysia has happened very slowly and the government still has a major 
role in health financing and provision, though private insurance is expanding rapidly.  
This stability of the public sector may indicate another important dimension of the 
context: where strong interests have been built up in state funding and provision over 
many decades, it is not easy to change that model.   Though the example of 
Singapore, which has moved from a largely tax-based and publicly provided health 
system at independence in 1965 to one where only 25% of total health care 
expenditure comes from government (Lim 2004), demonstrates it is not impossible.  
                                                          
6
 issues relating to sections 7 and 8 are addressed in more detail in a companion paper on actors and 
actor management 
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Although economic growth provides a conducive environment, the Thai experience 
demonstrates how a financial crisis can provide a window of opportunity for change.  
In the Thai case, the impact of the crisis on households, and the fact that many 
employees lost their jobs and hence their insurance coverage, highlighted the need for 
a comprehensive financing reform. 
 
Social solidarity has been highlighted as a key enabling factor behind European risk 
protection arrangements (Criel 1998), and in the creation and expansion of Japanese 
voluntary health insurance (Ogawa et al 2003).  Cultural influences have been cited 
both as an explanation for the maintenance of equity goals (the FSU for example: 
Ensor 1999), and for the maintenance of very high levels of copayment in national 
health insurance (the tradition of family responsibility in Korea; Mills 1998).    
 
External influences might be expected to be influential, given the role of the 
international and regional banks in funding health reform programmes and providing 
technical advice.  In the context of middle income countries, donor funding only 
contributes at the margin, so more important is likely to be the engagement in 
technical debates.  However, at least in the reformist countries such as Colombia and 
Mexico, it is not clear that the role of external actors has been key: in both cases the 
national reform protagonists have been vocal exponents of reform rationales both 
within and outside their countries.  In a lower income context, the language of a basic 
package provided at an affordable price to everyone does appear to have been 
influenced by external agencies, though with few marked successes in terms of 
implementation. 
  
 
8. Drivers of reforms 
 
Achieving universal coverage requires action on a number of fronts; hence a coalition 
of actors is likely to be crucial.  In Thailand, for example, technical experts and 
government bureaucrats worked with civil society groups and political parties to 
influence the adoption and implementation of reform.  One lesson from Colombia and 
Mexico is that it is important to look for win win solutions – for example reform to 
unpopular aspects of the social insurance systems provided the opportunity to extend 
coverage to the poor.  This avoided extension of coverage being the sole purpose of 
the reform, and brought together a coalition of supportive interests. 
 
In some settings external agencies have sought to influence reforms in favour of 
improved coverage, but often with limited success.  For many years in China, 
agencies such as the World Bank have provided evidence on the inequities which 
have followed the collapse of the commune system, but to apparently little effect.  
Continuing advice to Thailand and the Philippines has sought to encourage them to 
expand the SHI coverage to dependents of the workers, but with no progress. 
 
An important issue bears on the nature of the forces supporting social health 
insurance.  The International Labour Organisation, which supports the development of 
social security throughout the world, embodies a partnership between employers, 
employees, and governments.  This partnership is enshrined in the governance 
arrangements of social health insurance – for example the leading role played by 
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Ministries of Labour not Health, and the involvement of trade unions in scheme 
governance.  SHI arrangements can thus function to protect worker interests, which 
are not identical to those of the population at large. 
 
An opposite example is seen in the FSU, where the concept of universality was 
inherited from the Soviet era, and the introduction of SHI implies a disentitlement of 
the population in favour of the entitlement of employees.  Ensor argues that while it 
would be more effective to provide a minimum package to all and fund additions with 
contribution-related insurance, there are ‘immense political ramifications involved in 
overturning a long history of free services’ (Ensor, 1999: 875). He points out that 
“In Latin America social insurance expanded entitlement to services free at the point of delivery 
funded on the basis of income related (rather than risk rated, as with private insurance) 
contributions. In transitional Asia most countries begin from a universal entitlement based on 
citizenship. Payroll insurance has two possible implications. One is to dis-entitle people from 
universal coverage and demand that they re-register through their employment, purchase 
individual cover or qualify as socially protected to be covered from the public budget. The second 
possibility is to retain universal entitlement and to treat the payroll contribution as a tax on those 
unfortunate enough to work for enterprises liable (in theory and fact) for payment. However, in this 
case, there is little incentive to pay the contribution since it provides no additional benefits.” 
Kyrgyzstan is an exception in managing to implement a policy of a minimal package 
to all and funding additions with contribution related insurance, thus explicitly 
accepting a tiering of benefits by population group.  Good donor coordination appears 
to help explain the relative success of the policies (European Observatory on Health 
Systems and Policies 2004). 
 
Professional interests are often a complication in  developing universal coverage 
arrangements, especially given their interest in payment methods.  Countries in East 
Asia have struggled to obtain agreement to a move away from fee-for-service to case 
based payment, and separating drug dispensing from primary medical care is another 
common area of conflict.   
 
Both Mexico and Thailand exemplify the role that evidence derived from research can 
play in both preparing the way for reforms and pointing to solutions to problems.  In 
both countries, substantial efforts went into documenting inequities in payment for 
and access to care (Frenk 2006; Pannarunothai in press).  In both countries expert 
researchers worked very closely with bureaucrats and politicians to provide evidence.  
In Thailand, for example, this role was crucial in demonstrating that universal 
coverage would be affordable.   
 
Thailand also demonstrates the important role that elements of civil society can play.  
These included academics and social activists, and were aided by an informed and 
engaged media.  
 
 
9. Implications for policy and action 
 
The above review highlights a number of key choices and questions facing countries 
in their progress towards universal coverage. 
• Financing sources: 
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o What is the most desirable and feasible way of increasing mobilisation 
of compulsory revenues for health services? What is the preferred mix 
of general tax and mandatory insurance?   
o Does increased funding require greater mobilisation of funds, or is the 
taxation system raising adequate funds, and there is a case for a greater 
share to be allocated to health services? 
o How can the role of direct payments in the overall financing mix be 
minimised? 
o Should either or both of private voluntary insurance and community 
based insurance play a role in the financing system? 
• Pooling: how widely can funds be pooled, to minimise inequities in payment 
and benefits between pools 
• Purchasing: how can the purchasing role be strengthened, in order to improve 
equitable and efficient access to health services? What are the relative 
advantages of targeting subsidies to specific individuals, funding a local 
purchasing agency, or channelling funding direct to providers?  
• Provision of care: 
o Should countries provide a choice between public and private 
providers (assuming that payment methods can be put in place to 
control utilisation and costs) 
o Should benefits be comprehensive, or focused on a most cost-effective 
package, or on services most likely to be financially catastrophic to 
households? 
o What should the balance be between breadth of coverage (including as 
high a proportion as possible of the population) and depth of coverage 
(a large benefit package)?  
o Is one single benefit package feasible, or is it better to aim at a basic 
package and additional elements for better-off groups?  
o How can a benefit package be specified and applied? 
o How can the needs of especially disadvantaged groups be met? 
• Structure of arrangements 
o Should countries gradually expand a single scheme, or develop 
multiple arrangements and then seek over time to harmonise them? 
o Is the introduction of competition desirable either in choice of insurer, 
or choice of provider? 
 
From an equity perspective, the evidence suggests that at least in the early years of 
universal coverage, a system which depends mainly on mandatory insurance is likely 
to achieve a lower degree of equity in financing than one based on general tax 
revenue, though this conclusion needs testing with information from a wider range of 
countries.  Regardless of the main source of funding, a reduction of direct payments is 
vital to improve equity of financing. 
 
In terms of provision, the evidence suggests that the key issue is ensuring good 
physical access to  health services so that people can make use of their entitlement to 
care.  Other aspects of access may also be important, but evidence is thin on their 
significance relative to physical access.     
 
Even if countries inherit a universal system segmented into different schemes, or 
choose to develop separate schemes to cover hard-to-reach groups, it is important to 
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plan for a process that will harmonise contributions and benefits over time.  If richer 
groups are allowed to opt out, or differences between schemes allowed to become 
excessively institionalised or to increase over time, it can be very hard to challenge 
vested interests and almost impossible to level up benefits to achieve equitable 
arrangements for the whole population. 
 
Of countries that recently achieved universal coverage, their rapid progress started 
when they were already lower-middle income countries (Carrin and James 2004).  
Promoting universal coverage in low income countries is very difficult given their 
limited ability to raise sufficient revenues; these issues are further discussed in 
McIntyre et al (2005) and McIntyre (2006). In a low income context, the following 
mixes of financing are likely to be found: 
• Public funding to a network of public facilities, boosted by donor funding to 
varying degrees 
• Formal and or informal fees at public facilities  
• Very small scale compulsory health insurance in the formal employment 
sector (5-10% of population in SSA) (Waelkens et al) 
• Small scale community based health insurance, though rapidly growing in 
some settings (eg in West Africa from 76 active schemes in 1997 to 366 in 
2003) 
• Innovations such as equity funds, targeted cash transfers and/or vouchers for 
subsidised care for specific population groups (e.g. the poorest, households 
with orphans, refugees. 
 
Key financing issues in such settings include how best to gradually increase risk 
pooling arrangements over time, and how to ensure that the poorest and most socially 
disadvantaged receive priority in having their health care costs covered.  
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Figure 1: Out of pocket  payments as share of total health financing (data from 
Gottret and Schieber 2006) 
 
SOURCES OF HEALTH FINANCING
(Gottret and Schieber 2006) 
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Table 1: Share of different financing sources in total health financing, and 
overall incidence of health financing, selected Asian countries 
 
Country General tax 
% 
SHI 
% 
Direct 
payments % 
Concentration 
index* 
Hong Kong (1999-2000) 56 0 31 0.5590 
Indonesia (2001) 33 3 58 0.4704 
Japan (1998) 33 54 13 0.2553 
Korea Rep (2000) 16 34 50 0.3108 
Philippines (1999) 40 6 45 0.6020 
Sri Lanka (1996-7) 50 0 50 0.4724 
Taiwan (2000) 9 52 30 0.2341 
Thailand (2002) 56 61 33 0.5929 
 * Range is -1 to 1; positive (negative) value means rich (poor) contribute a larger share of income than 
the poor (rich); zero means everyone pays the same share 
Source: O’Donnell, van Doorslaer, Rannan-Eliya et al 2005a 
 
Table 2: Relative advantages and disadvantages of social health insurance and 
tax funding as the core approaches to financing universal coverage 
 
Aspect Tax funding Mandatory social health 
insurance funding 
Source of funding Pools money from all who 
fall within the tax net (both 
direct and indirect 
taxation) 
Employers and employees 
in formal sector 
Equity of financing Generally progressive Less progressive since 
progressivity likely to 
encourage under reporting 
of salaries and 
remuneration in kind 
Population coverage No limitations in theory Absolute number of 
beneficiaries and growth 
normally tied to size and 
nature of formal sector 
Coverage of hard to reach 
groups 
No barriers in principle Needs additional 
mechanisms and usually 
tax funding 
Health care benefits No required link between 
payment and benefits 
Contributions and benefits 
closely linked 
Demands on management Does not require a 
beneficiary-specific 
system, hence lower 
management costs 
Requires system for 
collecting revenue, 
identifying beneficiaries, 
paying for their care 
Political Share to health dependent 
on political decision-
making process 
Income earmarked for 
health 
Economic implications Dependent on taxation 
structure; does not need to 
be tied to employment 
Increases cost of 
employment 
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Table 3: Cross subsidies in Costa Rica 
 
 
Regime Ratio of premiums 
to costs 
Salaried 1.88 
Self-employed 0.29 
Pensioners 0.39 
Uninsured, 
indigents etc 
0.02 
Average 0.90 
Source: Saenz-Pacheco (2005). 
 
 
 
Table 4: Distribution of public health care subsidies to poorest and richest 20% 
of individuals (%) 
 
Country Hospital care 
 Inpatient Outpatient 
Non hospital 
care 
Total subsidy 
Poorest 20% 
Hong Kong 39 39 38 39 
Indonesia 3 6 20 13 
Sri Lanka 21 21  21 
Thailand 21 18 31 20 
Richest 20% 
Hong Kong 6 11 12 7 
Indonesia 52 46 18 31 
Sri Lanka 52 38 46 
Thailand 20 15 5 17 
Data for other countries in Table 1 not available 
Source: O’Donnell, van Doorslaer, Rannan-Eliya et al 2005b 
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Annex 1 
Terms of Reference: 
 
 
Paper A2:  Strategies to achieve universal coverage 
 
 
Overall requirements 
 
1. Provide a comprehensive but succinct report on the agreed topic.  The body of the report 
should be 20-40 pages, and generate lessons for senior policy-makers, donors and civil society 
groupings.   
2. Within this report, explain the nature of the evidence base used, and how/why evidence was 
identified and selected.  Further guidance on writing the report is provided in the 
accompanying generic guidelines to authors (Guideline to authors_Health Systems KN.doc), 
which should be considered part of these terms of reference. 
3. By end September 2006 submit a draft for comment. 
4. Incorporate comments by mid-January 2007. 
 
 
Guidelines for the writing of the report 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In addressing your theme, it is important that you: 
 
1) focus on health equity not simply addressing basic health needs and  bring a gender 
perspective to equity; 
2) focus not only on the available evidence but on the conclusions that can be drawn from this 
evidence; 
3) move beyond describing/delineating experiences, problems and challenges, to 
identifying/considering strategies for taking forward action, the institutional mechanisms for 
action and the enabling conditions, facilitators and barriers to such action; 
 
 
Priority issues of concern (depending on the availability of evidence as well as time constraints): 
• What is meant by the term ‘(equitable) universal coverage’?  (Discussion of the principles that 
underpin the term (e.g. cross-subsidy) and the different forms of coverage, including financial, 
geographic, type and quality of service etc.) 
• What is the current experience of financing options, or mixes of options, for achieving universal 
coverage in low- and middle-income settings?  Include a discussion of tax, insurance and user fees, 
especially with respect to the different degrees of cross-subsidy achieved and the impact on access 
to care.  Reflect on  the implications of levels of government spending for achieving universal 
coverage (and the role of donor financing and debt cancellation in augmenting government 
efforts). 
• What is the current experience of delivery options for achieving universal coverage in low- and 
middle-income settings?  (Reflect on the use of different types of providers, and the inclusion of 
different types of services/packages, commenting also on tiering and the quality of care.  What is 
the role of primary health care in achieving universal coverage?) 
• What are specific actions to provide financial risk protection and access to services for difficult-to-
cover groups (the unemployed, informal sector workers, the elderly, children, ?women)? 
• What contextual factors have opened up the policy space for countries to implement policies 
directed towards universal coverage?  (Reflect on the array of features listed in the generic 
guidelines to authors, most particularly the history of collective financing, the degree of social 
solidarity, and other social factors.) 
These specific guidelines should be read in conjunction with the generic guidelines for authors in the 
accompanying document (Guideline to authors_Health Systems KN.doc).   
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• In these countries, who were the main actors involved in the formulation, implementation or 
contestation of universal coverage policies?  What was their influence, and how was it managed by 
policy-makers in pushing through reform?  Who were the main drivers of reform?  (Include, where 
possible, a discussion of government actors, private health sector actors, trade unions, civil society 
groups, political parties and politicians.  Also reflect on whether reform was driven by politicians 
or bureaucrats.) 
• What mechanisms are successful in cost-containment in order to keep universal coverage 
affordable?  How can these mechanisms ensure that the quality of care is maintained?  Include a 
discussion of payment mechanisms and different types of provider. 
 
Other papers pertinent to this paper: 
• Strategies for achieving universal coverage in Thailand (Paper C12) 
 
 
Disclaimer 
 
Near the beginning of your paper you must place the following disclaimer: 
 
“This work was carried out on behalf of the Health Systems Knowledge  
Network established as part of the WHO Commission on the Social  
Determinants of Health. The work of this network is funded by a grant  
from the International Development Research Centre, Ottawa, Canada. The views presented in this 
paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the decisions, policy or views of 
IRDC, WHO or Commissioners [or, in the case of work that has not been reviewed by the KN, the 
Health Systems Knowledge Networks].” 
 
 
Assignment of copyright 
 
The intellectual property rights of this work will be vested in the authors of the case study.  The Centre 
for Health Policy, as co-ordinator of the KN Hub, is herewith granted a non-exclusive, world-wide, 
royalty-free and sub-licensable licence to use, reproduce, synthesize, adapt, publish, and disseminate 
your paper in whatever format - paper, electronic or otherwise - and in whatever manner as it may 
deem appropriate in the interests of the KN.   The Centre for Health Policy will also have first right to 
publish the information on behalf of the KN.  It is the intention of the KN Hub to make all products as 
widely available as possible. For example, while it is intended that the case study will feed into the 
KN’s final reports, the case study may also be posted onto a website and possibly included in a 
publication.  This will be negotiated towards the end of the lifetime of the KN. 
 
Where the KNs, WHO or the CSDH use the paper, authorship will be acknowledged through citation of 
references. It will remain the prerogative of the Centre for Health Policy not to use the products of this 
work.   
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Annex 2: The supplementary literature review7 
 
Search strategy 
 
The supplementary literature review was as systematic as possible given substantial time and money 
constraints, and was designed to complement the initial literature review which drew on the author’s 
experience, contacts and files.  The supplementary literature review especially targeted regions and 
countries which had been poorly covered in the initial review, namely North Africa, the Middle East, 
and the countries of the former Soviet Union. The primary databases searched were PubMed, Ingenta, 
ELDIS, JSTOR, IBSS and ISS Web of Knowledge. Online searches were performed using Google 
Scholar and the websites of WHO, World Bank, Abt Associates and European Observatory for Health.   
The search terms included ‘universal coverage’ and ‘health’ alone and in combination with ‘developing 
country’, ‘Africa’, ‘Maghreb’, ‘sub-Saharan Africa’, ‘Former Soviet Union’,  ‘Moldova’, ‘Kyrgystan’, 
‘Kazakhstan’, ‘Uzbekistan’ and ‘Latin America’; ‘cobertura universal’ and ‘salud’; ‘couverture 
universelle’ and ‘santé’ ;‘universal healthcare’ in combination with ‘Africa’; ‘universal access’ and 
‘health’ alone and in combination with ‘Jordan’, ‘Morocco’, ‘Tunisia’, ‘Egypt’; ‘health insurance’ and 
‘developing countries’. 
 
The search included peer-reviewed academic literature and grey literature (i.e. internal, external and 
non-reviewed reports) in English, French and Spanish published between 1990 and 2006 and was 
conducted in December 2006. Manual searches of the bibliographies of published papers were 
undertaken. Titles and abstracts of 4,472 articles and reports were read.  
 
Those articles and reports which focused on universal coverage and methods to achieve it, in Africa 
and the Former Soviet Union, in individual middle- and low-income countries, or which offered a 
review of middle- and low-income countries experiences, were kept. Articles which focused on high-
income countries, individual middle-income countries in Asia or Latin-America, community based 
health insurance and its variants (mutuelles, community insurance) or simply outlined advantages and 
disadvantages of various financing mechanisms without providing any innovative analysis, were 
excluded.  A total of 31 articles and reports were included of which 15 were peer-reviewed and 16 were 
grey literature. 
 
A further non-systematic search was undertaken for the countries included in Annex 3 using the same 
primary databases and websites. Search terms used included the names of the countries in combination 
with ‘health’ and ‘policy’, ‘cost containment’, ‘financing’, ‘actors’)     
 
Overview of searches for supplementary literature review  
1. Google scholar 
Universal coverage AND Africa AND health: 807 recent articles 
Universal coverage AND health AND Sub Saharan Africa: 621 articles  
Universal coverage AND health AND Maghreb: 15 articles 
Universal coverage AND Algeria AND health: 62 results 
Universal coverage AND health AND Former Soviet Union: 485 articles  
Universal coverage AND Moldova AND health: 46 entries  
Universal coverage AND Kyrgyzstan AND health: 66 results 
Universal coverage AND Kazakhstan AND health:73 results 
Universal coverage AND Uzbekistan AND health: 55 results 
Universal healthcare AND Africa: 187 entries 
Universal access AND Jordan AND health: 166 entries 
Universal access AND Morocco AND health: 92 entries 
Universal access AND Tunisia AND health: 67 entries 
Universal access AND Egypt AND health: 166 entries 
Cobertura universal AND salud: 356 entries 
Couverture universelle AND santé: 47 entries 
 
2. JSTOR 
Universal healthcare: 11 articles 
                                                          
7
 Undertaken by Nouria Brikci 
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Universal coverage and health: 338 articles 
 
3. Abt Associates 
Universal coverage: 62 reports 
 
4. ELDIS 
Universal coverage AND health: 37 articles 
 
5. PubMed 
Universal coverage AND health: 22 articles  
Health insurance AND developing countries: 171 articles  
Health insurance AND Africa, North: 24 articles  
 
6. IBSS 
Universal coverage: 18 articles  
 
7. Ingenta 
Universal coverage AND health: 89 articles  
Universal coverage AND health AND developing country: 3 articles  
Universal coverage AND middle income country AND health: 3 articles 
Universal coverage AND low income country AND health: 3 articles 
Universal healthcare: 93 articles 
 
8. ISS web of knowledge 
Universal care AND health AND Latin America: 6 articles 
Cobertura universal AND salud: None 
Universal coverage AND health: 217 articles 
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Annex 3 Summary of evidence from selected middle income countries in Asia and Latin America which have recently achieved 
universal coverage (UC), or are committed to achieving it relatively soon  
 
South-East Asia 
 
Indicator/issue Thailand Philippinesi Korea Taiwan 
UC arrangements 3 main schemes; scheme for 
general population (30B 
scheme) least well funded 
SHI plus voluntary enrolment 
of individuals and 
encouragement to 
cooperatives and 
microfinance groups to act as 
intermediaries  
Single fund (recently merged); 
SHI-based; contribution rates 
vary by group  
National health insurance; single fund 
Population coverage Close to 100% 70%, includes only 17% of 
informal sector; aim is UC by 
2010 
Close to 100% >97%ii 
Government health 
expenditure per 
capita at international 
dollar rateiii 
(2003) 
160 76 531 c500/800 (depending on method of calculation) 
GNI per capita 
(2003- 
Current international 
US$)  
7,340 4,670 19,210 12,572iv 
Main cross-subsidies Tax funding to 30B scheme 
(tax subsidies also to SSS and 
CSMBS) 
From private employees to 
indigents 
Tax subsidies to self-
employed 
From tax payers to low-income families 
Financing mix Tax, user fees (minor), payroll 
tax 
Payroll tax, general tax, 
copayments 
Payroll tax, general tax, high 
copayments 
Payroll tax, general tax, copayments 
Benefit package Reasonably comprehensive Favours hospital care Limited to specified elementsv Comprehensive covering preventive and 
medical services, prescription drugs, dental 
services, Chinese medicine and home nurse 
visitsvi  
Provider types Mainly public for 30B; public 
and private for others 
Public and private accredited 
hospitals 
Compulsory contracts with all 
facilities; 50% hospitals for 
Mix of public-private delivery system (35% of 
beds in hospitals are public, 65% are privatevii) 
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Indicator/issue Thailand Philippinesi Korea Taiwan 
profit, 44% NFP; 7% public 
Provider payment Capitation for ambulatory care, 
DRG/global budget for 
inpatient care 
Providers set fees and 
PhilHealth reimburses up to 
fixed amounts 
Fee for service and 
experimenting with DRG and 
RBRV (Resource based 
relative valueviii) 
Original FFS for hospitals changed to global 
budget (Wagstaff, 2005). 63% of physicians 
paid on salaried basis, some receive bonus 
payments based on productivity, remainder are 
FFS private practitionersix. First level clinics are 
paid FFS, DRG system used for 50 most 
common diseases to be extendedx 
Access differences Reflecting demand and supply 
side factors 
Access to accredited 
hospitals good only in large 
cities 
For uncovered services NHI greatly reduced differences, but middle 
class benefit most in absolute terms 
Tiering/quality of 
care differences 
Between CSMBS, SSS, 30B Little evidence but 
differences between rural and 
urban 
Little evidence but high OOP 
for all uncovered services 
must produce difference in 
quality of care between those 
who can afford to pay and 
those who cannot 
Free choice; no rationingxi 
Role of primary care Gate keeping for 30B scheme Not covered No gate-keeping; strong 
hospital role 
Large hospitals increasingly dominant source of 
care 
Efforts to cover 
specific groups 
Tax funding so targeting not 
needed; long term policy of 
extending public infrastructure; 
recent efforts to strengthen 
PHC; exemptions for 
unregistered 
Means testing to identify 
indigent; enrolment funded 
by central and local 
governments; encouragement 
to local insurance schemes 
Self employed contribution 
based on both income and 
property and subsidised   
Incentives for providers to practice in remote 
areas introduced; Organization and 
encouragement of mobile services for remote 
areas; poor and those living in remote areas 
exempted of cost sharing xii 
 
Cost containment 
measures 
Capitation (SSS); Capitation 
plus global budget (30B) 
None Capitation (OP) and DRG 
within global budget (IP); PC 
gatekeeper 
Global budgetxiii 
Introduction of Cost Sharing and single payer 
systemxiv  
Contextual factors 
opening up policy 
space for UC 
High economic growth; 
financial crisis; high OOP 
Strong political commitment 
to universal coverage 
High economic growth; 
competition with North Korea 
High economic growth, high level of income 
Main actors/drivers 
of reform 
Popularist government; strong 
support from public health 
leaders and policy analysts 
Government Military regime to get political 
legitimacy; subsequent 
governments as part of social 
Political pressure from opposition party and 
dooming elections in 1995 pushed the then 
President Lee to decree operational the National 
xv
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Indicator/issue Thailand Philippinesi Korea Taiwan 
development; employers to 
help manage funds (self-
employed negative) 
Health Insurance Lawxv 
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Latin America xvi 
 
 Brazil Chile Costa Rica Mexico Colombia 
UC arrangements Multiple: Federal 
government, states, 
municipalities, private 
insurers 
Multiple: FONASA 
(public sector 
insurance), ISAPRES 
(competing private 
sector insurers) 
Based on SHI; social 
security manages 
arrangements for all 
3 public insurance schemes: 
govt employees, private 
employees, others (popular 
health insurance) (voluntary) 
 
Compulsory insurance for 
employed; subsidised scheme 
for others; Competitive insurers 
Single Solidarity Fund 
(FOSYGA) seeks to ensure that 
contributory regime works as 
much as possible as single risk 
pool  
Population 
coverage 
Goal of 100% (no 
consolidated data on coverage 
of public and private agents at 
the primary care level) xvii 
86%xviii 90% in 2000 
 
Aim is 100% by 2010  Aim is 100% but in 2000 42.6% 
at least of the population was 
not insuredxix 
Government 
health 
expenditure per 
capita at 
international 
dollar ratexx 
(2003) 
270 345 486 270 439 
GNI per capita 
(2003- 
Current 
international 
US$)xxi 
7,470 9,850 8,770 9,140 6,590 
Main cross-
subsidies 
From tax payers to lower 
income and rural families 
From the state to lower 
income families. 
From employed to 
informal sector and 
elderly 
From tax payers to lower 
income families 
From taxpayers to lower 
income insured, plus 1% wage 
contribution from compulsory 
insurance scheme. From tax 
payers  to uninsured through 
supply side subsidiesxxii.  
Financing mix General tax revenues at 
central, states and 
xxiii
Payroll tax (17%), 
general tax (28%), 
Payroll tax (54%), 
general tax (11%) 
Payroll taxes (30%); general 
tax (15%);  
Payroll taxes (49%); general 
taxes (34%); 10% out-of-
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municipality levelxxiii (46%), 
out-of-pocket (35%), others, 
incl. tax on financial 
transactions (19%). 
copayments  (27%), 
other (28%) 
Out-of-pocket (34%) 52% out-of-pocket, 3% other pocket, 7% other 
Benefit package Basic care package 
established in 1988 
Public sector: similar 
care, including 56 
interventions defined in 
2003xxiv. Private care: 
level of benefit varies 
according to premium 
paid and medical risk of 
the insured person. 
Basic primary care 
package 
Comprehensive primary and 
secondary care; gradual 
increase in coverage of high 
cost care for popular scheme 
Comprehensive package for 
compulsory insurance. Only 
services provided at first level 
of care for subsidised insurance 
(Rosa and Alberto, 2004: 137).  
Provider types Public and private contracted 
institutions 
Public and private 
accredited or 
independent contracted 
institutions 
Public and private 
contracted 
institutions (mostly 
social security 
providers (Caja 
Costarricense) 
State health systems 
Social security (IMSS and 
others) 
Private providers 
Public and contracted private 
institutions 
Provider payment Capitation At secondary and 
tertiary levels, limited 
use of DRG and 
prospective payment for 
services and continued 
use of historical 
budgetsxxv. At primary 
level, proposed use of 
per capita payment. 
Fee for first level 
services and hospital 
production units for 
hospital servicesxxvi 
Capitation Capitation payment for primary 
care; FFS and case based 
payment for hospital care 
Access differences Inequalities in terms of 
coverage between rural and 
urban areasxxvii  
Not in theory but in 
practice better care 
available to those who 
can pay and waiting lists 
hamper accessxxviii 
Geographical 
differences as not all 
services are similarly 
available throughout 
the country (Vargas 
et al, 2002:14xxix) 
No data found but difficulty in 
access for the poor who want 
to go beyond the essential 
health package or live in 
underserved areas (Laurell, 
2001xxx) 
No data in terms of access 
found. In terms of insurance 
affiliation, more than 60% of 
the population in the first 
income decile do not have any 
health insurance, while almost 
4% of those in higher income 
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deciles have one or more forms 
of insurance (Rosa and Alberto, 
2004: 137) 
Tiering/quality of 
care differences 
Basic and more complex 
public care not available 
everywhere although private 
services available to those in 
private schemes (82% of 
which belong to the four 
highest income deciles and 
only 2.2% to population using 
public scheme)xxxi. 
Public sector: similar 
care in theory. Private 
care: level of benefit 
varies according to 
premium paid and 
medical risk of the 
insured person. Problem 
of cream skimming. 
Not found in 
literature 
Although private providers are 
legally required to offer care to 
those unable to pay, loopholes 
are exploited creating a two-
tier system between the poor 
and wealthyxxxii. At the public 
level, quality of care may have 
decreasedxxxiii. 
Different services provided to 
those in compulsory insurance 
and in subsidised scheme. Plans 
to equalise care between two 
groups by 2001 not achieved 
(Rosa and Alberto: 2004:137). 
Role of primary 
care 
Strong in some provinces, 
particularly Northeastern 
Brazil ones such as Cearaxxxiv 
Since 1990 Chile has 
been implementing a 
Primary Care approach 
focused on community 
and familyxxxv 
Strong Not very strong: although the 
second generation of health 
reforms were based on primary 
care (from 1970s), the third 
generation from 1990s 
refocused on purchaser-
provider split etc away from 
PHC goal. Result is that poor 
and wealthy choose private 
sectorxxxvi 
Hospitals appear to play major 
role in primary care  
Efforts to cover 
specific groups 
Funrual programme caters for 
rural workers and their 
families; Programa de Pronta 
Acao for the needy and 
population with no formal 
link with Welfare; National 
Committee for health of black 
populationxxxvii 
Protection of indigents; 
special agreement with 
temporary workers 
Family membership 
made compulsory in 
1956 
Specific attention 
given to children and 
teenagers, disabled 
people, elderly 
people, indigeneous 
groups and 
migrantsxxxviii 
Highly subsidised voluntary 
enrolment for those outside 
formal sector and for the poor 
(families in the lowest income 
decilesxxxix) 
Subsidised insurance for lower 
income households identified 
through a means test. 
Cost containment 
measures 
Market regulation of prices to 
rationalize health 
Focus on limited 
number of interventions 
Rationalisation of 
tertiary level care 
xl
Focus on cost-effective public 
health interventions 
No. Health expenditure has 
skyrocketed since introduction 
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expenditures.  in public sector, use of 
co-payments 
providedxl of reform in part because of 
lack of incentives for 
efficiencyxli. Continuing supply 
side subsidies and tariffs higher 
than costs of health service 
production (Rosa and Alberto, 
2004: 133) 
Contextual factors 
opening up policy 
space for UC 
Economic crisis, structural 
reforms, persistent poverty 
then transition to democracy 
(hence obligation to 
incorporate excluded 
population in social system) 
and need to improve 
efficiency and effectiveness 
of health systemxlii 
Economic crisis and 
resistance to 
involvement of 
international 
institutions, renewed 
interest in the ‘social’ in 
the 1990s, economic 
growth thereafter. 
High economic 
growthxliii, 
democracyxliv, 
political legitimacy 
of Figueresxlv 
Comparative evidence on 
inequitable health system 
Main 
actors/drivers of 
reform 
Traditional elite, emergent 
political forces, national 
social organisationsxlvii 
Government Extensive MoH 
research, presidential 
pushxlviii 
New government; research on 
problems; evaluation of 
solutions 
Constitutional pillar of 
inalienable right of all citizens 
to health (Art 48) (Rosa and 
Alberto, 2004: 131), result of 
civil movements requests, 
political negotiations between 
different actors (Hernandez M, 
2002xlvi) 
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